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Abstract
Predictive accounts of belief ascription, either following the prin-
ciple of charity or Dennett’s intentional stance, have proved popular
recently. However, such accounts require us first to treat agents as per-
fectly rational agents and then revise this assumption as appropriate.
I argue that such downwards revision is no easy task and that several
proposed accounts are not satisfactory. I propose a way of character-
ising agent’s belief states which shares Dennett’s approach but avoids
treating agents as perfectly rational, and develop a formal account in
terms of fan models.
1 Introduction
Since Quine’s Word and Object [Qui60], there has been more-or-less gen-
eral agreement on the correct treatment of intentional attitudes. In a strict
ontological sense, “the canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme” ac-
cording to which there are “no propositional attitudes but only the physical
constitution and behaviour of organisms” [Qui60, p. 221]. However, inten-
tional idioms are “practically indispensable” [Qui60, p. 219].1 There are,
of course, disagreements within this general viewpoint. Dennett [Den87,
pp. 342–343] divides the resulting accounts into those based on a norma-
tive principle, according to which we ascribe the attitudes an agent ought
to have, given its circumstances, and those based on a projective principle,
whereby one ascribes those attitudes that one would have oneself in those
circumstances. In this paper, I want to consider the former group of ac-
counts, which includes those based around Davidson’s principle of charity
[Dav85] and Dennett’s own intentional stance [Den87]. In particular, I want
to argue that Dennett’s intentional stance has great difficulty in dealing with
agents with bounded rationality—you, me, and everyone else.
1See also Sellars [Sel56].
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I will assume, without much argument, that Dennett’s motivation is more
or less correct, but argue that the method he gives us for ascribing beliefs
and desires to others cannot avoid attributing too many beliefs. I will then
suggest another method, which shares Dennett’s outlook but avoids this
problem.
2 The Predictive Strategy
is intended as a way of bridging the gap between realist and interpretational
accounts of intentional attitude attribution (or rather, of claiming that this
is a deeply unhelpful dichotomy). Dennett holds that, “while belief is a
perfectly objective phenomenon . . . it can be discerned only from the point
of view of one who adopts a certain predictive strategy, and its existence
can be confirmed only by an assessment of the success of that strategy”
[Den87, p. 15]. Here, Dennett is in agreement with Quine in that determin-
ing the truth of belief attributions could not be reduced to the existence
some underlying physical phenomena:
It will often happen also that there is just no saying whether
to count an affirmation of a propositional attitude as true or
false, even given full knowledge of its circumstances and purposes
[Qui60, p. 218].
Dennett describes his approach as follows:
first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be pre-
dicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that
agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose.
Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same
considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent
will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little
practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will
in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought
to do; that is what you predict the agent will do. [Den87, p. 17]
Let us call this method of ascribing beliefs the predictive strategy. A first
objection is that it becomes hard to explain false belief. If we follow Den-
nett’s claim that we should “attribute as beliefs all the truths relevant to
the system’s interests (or desires) that the system’s experience to date has
made available” [Den87, p. 18], then how can we explain where false beliefs
come from?
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Dennett’s response is that “[t]he falsehood has to start somewhere”
[Den87, p. 19]. Stich [Sti81] objects that there remain situations that cannot
be explained in this way. One of his examples considers a newspaper vendor
who on an occasion gives the wrong change. But what, as Dennett replies,
is to be explained here? If this was a genuine mistake, perhaps caused by a
temporary brain malfunction or miscalculation, then we would not expect
to rationalise the mistake in terms of beliefs and desires [Den87, pp. 83–88].
It was an irrational mistake and so we should not search for rational reasons.
Dennett’s response is acceptable in the case of an irrational error, such
as the vendor’s mistake. The vendor would more than likely be unable to
explain why he made the mistake himself. However, the situation changes
when we consider mistakes that happen because of bounded resources. Sup-
pose a chess player could win a game by making a particular series of moves
but, because he has limited time in which to think and can only think a
certain number of moves ahead, does not make these moves and ends up
losing. In a sense, he has made a mistake because he did not make the most
rational moves (assuming, of course, that he wanted to win). The problem
here is that the agent’s experience—his knowledge of the rules of chess and
the positions of the pieces on the board—makes available to him information
about the winning strategy.2 But we should not be tempted to say that the
agent had no reason for acting as he did, i.e. with less than ideal rationality.
If we pointed out the winning strategy to the agent after the game, he might
claim that he could have discovered it himself, if only he had more time, or
an ability to look more moves ahead. So there are reasons we can cite to
explain cases of agents acting with less than perfect rationality. These rea-
sons are not captured by Dennett’s predictive strategy, which would predict
that the agent chooses the winning strategy every time.
A related problem is that, in treating agents as perfect reasoners, it
is difficult to distinguish those beliefs an agent has, from those it might
come to believe through further reasoning. Dennett’s partial response is
to distinguish opinion, which is a classical on-off affair, from belief which
may be a matter of degree, governed by Baysian rules [Den81, chapter 16].
Opinion is a matter of assent but nevertheless belief provides the basis for
an agent’s opinion. We should at the least be able to say, given that agent
a has these beliefs, that it should be able to assent to this or that (or come
to this opinion). Dennett agrees with de Sousa [dS71] that a Baysian-style
2We might be tempted to say that the information about the winning strategy was not
available to the agent at all, since his bounded resources did not permit him to access the
information in a useful way. I discuss a logic of information in [Jag06a].
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theory of belief should be used “to explain (or at least predict statistically)
the acts of assent we will make given our animal-level beliefs and desires.”
Such beliefs “explain our proclivity to make these leaps of assent, to act, to
bet on the truth of various sentences.” [Den81, p. 304].
The problem here is that one can only give one’s assent based on one’s
beliefs if one can see how what one is assenting to is one of, or is supported
by, one’s beliefs; otherwise, we are simply discussing an agent who guesses all
the time. Let us consider an example. Any student with a very minimal set
of beliefs (that one should endeavour to answer the questions; one should
give the answers one believes to be true . . . ) would be predicted to do
very well in his first-year logic exam. Similarly, a mathematics student who
knows the axioms of some theory would be said to believe (and also know)
all theorems of the theory—however complicated they may be. In fact, few
students achieve 100% on their logic test and no one knows or believes all the
theorems of arithmetic, say, let alone all the relevant meta-theorems. This
is why logical and mathematical discoveries are surprising and informative.
My bias in this discussion is therefore motivated by the following principle:
we should not ascribe beliefs to agents that they could not, given their
cognitive limitations, assent to. In following this principle, we also remove
the temptation to think that the chess playing agent will always take the
winning strategy.
This motivates the following question: what notion do we capture in
treating agents as ideal reasoners? Certainly not belief (at least, as we
use the term), for real agents are far from ideally rational when it comes
to managing their own beliefs. But the assumption of perfect rationality
nevertheless has a place, in showing what an agent’s rational commitments
are in having certain beliefs and opinions. In judging the world to be a
certain way, for instance, an agent commits itself to the consequences of
that judgement. If an agent judges φ1, . . . , φn to be the case and ψ is a
consequence of these judgements but is rejected by the agent, then we could
point out some error in the agent’s reasoning. In showing the agent that ψ
is a consequence of judgements she has made, we would expect her to either
change her mind about ψ or else reject one of the original judgements.
In talking about the consequences of an agent’s judgements, we may want
to restrict the notion to relevant consequences, perhaps by taking relevant
implication as our model. In this way, we can rule out the strange com-
mitments involving material implications, such as one’s judgements about
what to have for tea committing one to p→ q ∨ q → r, for any (completely
unrelated) propositions p, q, r. In a similar way, the notion of commitment
should avoid the ex contradictione quad libet principle, or principle of ex-
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plosion, whereby contradictory judgements would commit an agent to every
proposition whatsoever. An acceptable, non-explosive notion of consequence
must therefore tolerate a degree of contradiction, as paraconsistent logics do.
So, the notion of commitment, given what an agent judges, should be char-
acterised along the lines of a paraconsistent, relevant consequence relation.
It is clear that this notion of commitment is too strong for an analysis
of belief. An agent need not believe all of the things it commits itself to in
making judgements; it could only do so if it were an ideal agent, with perfect
rationality and unlimited cognitive capacity (memory, time to reason and so
on). So, the commitments one forms in making judgements form an upper
limit on what that agent believes. Moreover, the judgements an agent makes
(the opinions it forms, the sentences it accepts or assents to) form a lower
bound on what the agent believes. If an agent judges that φ then it believes
that φ and it believes φ only if it is thereby committed to the truth of φ.
3 Avoiding Idealised Ascriptions
In the previous section, the consequences of an agent’s beliefs were termed
the commitments of those beliefs. The question that needs to be addressed
now is: how can Dennett’s predictive strategy result in a notion of belief
which differs from (is weaker than) that of commitment? Dennett’s sugges-
tion is as follows.
One starts with the idea of perfect rationality and revises down-
wards as circumstances dictate. That is, one starts with the as-
sumption that people believe all the implications of their beliefs
and believe no contradictory pairs of beliefs. . . . one is inter-
ested only in ensuring that the system is rational enough to get
to the particular implications that are relevant to its behavioural
predicament of the moment. [Den87, p. 21]
Let us call this the downwards revision approach. Now, one might quite
legitimately ask: just what is the measure of rationality appealed to here
supposed to consist in? and just how does one revise downwards? I now
take a look at two possible suggestions which attempt to explain downwards
revision. Since a fully fleshed-out predictive strategy would incorporate
a formal model of belief—a Baysian model, for example—an approach to
downward revision should also be based on a more-or-less formal approach.
Otherwise, we will not have a method at all; rather, we will be left with an
ad hoc way of pruning beliefs.
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A first suggestion is found in Hintikka’s notion of logical competence
[Hin75]. To be sure, one’s logical competence does not exhaust one’s ratio-
nal ability but it is a component of it. If we cannot provide a method of
downward revision to the way we ascribe logical competence to an agent,
we cannot give a method of downwards revision for the way we ascribe ra-
tionality to that agent in general. Hintikka describes logical models which
are inconsistent from a classical point of view, but “so subtly inconsistent
that the inconsistency could not be expected to be known (perceived) by an
everyday logician, however competent.” [Hin75, p. 478] Suppose an agent
considers the sentences satisfied by such a model to state genuine possibil-
ities. That agent will thereby be taking some impossibilities to be possible
and, in doing so, will not consider all valid sentences (or all consequences
of its beliefs) to be true. We therefore have some handle on her logical
competence, depending on the degree to which contradictions in the model
manifest themselves.
The details of such models are provided by Rantala in [Ran75], where
he uses the term urn models. I omit the details here (see [Jag06b, chapter
2] for a detailed discussion). The problem with such models is that agents
remain believers in all instances of propositional tautologies. An agent’s
variable-free beliefs will be deductively closed and we will not be able to
subtract from our initial assumption of perfect rationality in this domain.
Moreover, we have no reason to suppose that an agent’s competence will be
a fixed parameter across the board. There are numerous sentences which the
agent could derive, given her assumed degree of rationality and which she
will therefore be ascribed belief in on the predictive strategy, which she will
in fact not believe in the slightest. A mathematician who has spent months
working towards proving a particular theorem is likely to have beliefs in
that domain of far greater justificatory complexity than in other domains,
or even in other mathematical fields. A logician might even be able to
prove a complex theorem but have trouble with, what from the viewpoint
of quantifier depth alone, appears to be less complex, such as deriving a
corollary. This could not be explained using Hintikka’s notion of logical
competence.3
As an alternative approach, we might adapt Fagin and Halpern’s ac-
count in [FH88] and begin by ascribing an idealised theory of belief to an
agent, but then filter the results through an ‘awareness’ filter. Awareness
is a purely syntactic notion and so it is possible to alter the properties of
awareness without modifying the underlying idealised account of belief. We
3Similar examples are discussed in [Jag06b, ch. 1].
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need not specify properties of the awareness set a priori, but “[o]nce we have
a concrete interpretation in mind, we may want to add some restrictions”
[FH88, p. 54]. However, it seems essential to the success of the awareness
model that, in general, awareness sets have no closure properties whatsoever.
As Fagin and Halpern comment,
people do not necessarily identify formulas such as ψ∧φ and φ∧
ψ. Order of presentation does seem to matter. And a computer
program that can determine whether φ ∧ ψ follows from some
initial premises in time τ might not be able to determine whether
ψ ∧ φ follows from those premises in time τ . [FH88, p. 53, their
emphasis]
Given a concrete formulation of awareness we may ask, why could this notion
not be used to define a notion of belief directly, using whatever principles
were used to determine the properties of the awareness set? A potential no-
tion of awareness given in [FH88, 54] is that the elements of the awareness set
are precisely those sentences that the agent could determine as consequences
of information they already possess in a specified space and/or time bound.
This is, roughly, the notion of belief I will propose below, although I will do
so directly, making no use of the evidently spurious notion of awareness.
A further suggestion as to how we might scale down our attributions
of rationality from the ideal case is as follows. The beliefs we ascribe on
the back of the predictive strategy are not ascribed piecemeal, but as part
of a holistic network. Certain beliefs support certain others such that, in
the case of a perfectly rational agent, believing the supports is sufficient
for believing the supported beliefs. So we have a justification network: a
network of beliefs with justifications marked within it. Such structures are
common in current AI practise.4 Some beliefs might be taken as supplied
directly by experience and so have no support within the network of beliefs
itself. These include the mundane, everyday beliefs which we are too busy
to ever explicitly consider or judge, such as the belief that there is a chair
in front of me, but no dancing elephants.
Suppose we mark such beliefs as being experientially (as opposed in-
ferentially) justified and then calculate the justificatory complexity of the
other beliefs based on the shortest path in the justification network from the
belief in question to a set of beliefs which supports it. We could then revise
downwards by throwing out those beliefs of higher justificatory complexity
first. Our measure of rationality would be the agent’s ability to reason to
4They are used extensively in the areas of belief revision and belief update, for example.
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beliefs of certain justificatory complexity from a given support set. How-
ever, in typical cases, there need not be a uniform degree of justificatory
complexity throughout the beliefs at the periphery of an agent’s justifica-
tion network. There are numerous sentences which an agent could derive,
given her assumed degree of rationality, which she will in fact not believe
in the slightest. A mathematician who has spent months working towards
proving a particular theorem is likely to have beliefs in that domain of far
greater justificatory complexity than in other domains, or even in other
mathematical fields.
Moreover, beliefs may be justified in more than one way. For example,
we cannot tell whether the set {φ, ψ, φ → ψ} was obtained by modus po-
nens from {φ, φ → ψ} or from {φ, ψ} by disjunction introduction and the
rewrite rule for ‘→’ in terms of ‘∨’. The problem is that, in starting from
the viewpoint of perfect rationality, we cannot always decide which justi-
fication network to associate with a given set of beliefs. We might know
that we need to treat our agent as believing φ, ψ and φ → ψ in order to
explain its behaviour, for example, but could not infer how these beliefs
arose. We could not then say what degree of rationality we were thereby
attributing to the agent and so could not say just how far we need to revise
our initial assumptions of perfect rationality. If we were to precede in the
other direction, from a small set of beliefs and build a justification network
from bottom up, we would not have this problem. Then we would not need
the initial assumption of perfect rationality; we would only need to assume
reasoning ability to a certain level. This is roughly the model that I will
present in section 5 below.
4 Sentential Accounts
Above, I made a distinction between belief on the one hand and opinion
or assent on the other. We might also include judgements in the latter
category whose members, according to Dennett [Den81, Chapter 16] and de
Sousa [dS71], are not to be treated on a par with belief. One way to make
the distinction, following Malcolm [Mal72], would be to claim that, whilst
it certainly seems appropriate to say that a chicken believes (or thinks) that
going to the farmer is a way of getting fed, it certainly has not judged or
formed the opinion that this is so; nor has it assented to that statement.
Forming judgements and opinions and assenting to statements are conscious
mental acts, whereas having beliefs might be viewed as a different class
of mental phenomenon altogether, operating on a more fundamental, sub-
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personal level. This is why it makes sense to attribute beliefs to an agent
that it has not explicitly considered.
However, this does not licence the claim that, whilst judgement, opinion
and assent are to be cashed out in terms of statements—i.e. unambiguous
sentences—beliefs are to be ascribed in terms of non-linguistic entities. For
example, Dennett (following Stalnaker [Sta76]) claims that “a particular be-
lief is a function taking possible worlds into truth values” [Den81, p. 305],
thus identifying a belief with what many take to be an intention or a mean-
ing.5 Now of course it may be the case that the processes in an agent’s brain
which give rise to the behavioural phenomena via which we attribute beliefs
are themselves non-linguistic. However, we must remember that beliefs are
ascribed at a certain level of description of the agent so that, even if the rel-
evant processes subvenient to belief are intrinsically non-linguistic, we need
not conclude that our ways of ascribing belief should be propositional, rather
than sentential. As discussed above, there may be no interesting question
as to what beliefs really are, so such considerations should not be allowed
to persuade us of the supposed de re nature of belief.
The sense in which belief is a de re propositional phenomenon is as fol-
lows. Suppose two agents each have a belief that they would express as “it’s
raining.” Agent a has the belief in London on Monday, b has it in New
York on Wednesday. So a believes that it is raining in London on Monday,
whereas b believes it to be raining in New York on Wednesday. They have
different beliefs, and what distinguishes them is not anything linguistic, but
rather the de re fact that London isn’t New York, and Monday isn’t Wednes-
day. However, for all practical purposes—explaining and making predictions
about behaviour—the sentence “it’s raining”, understood in its appropriate
context, is perfectly adequate. Why did the agent take an umbrella? Because
it believed that it was raining.
Moreover, the de re content of the sentence that an agent would use to ex-
press her belief might not be adequate as an explanation or prediction of her
behaviour. Consider an agent perpetually annoyed by mobile phones ring-
ing on public transport who, upon hearing a phone continuously ring whilst
on the train to London, gets increasingly annoyed. Each time it rings, she
tries to locate the source of the annoying ring. Finally, she realises that she
has left her own phone in her luggage at the end of the carriage, so comes
to have a belief that she would most naturally express as ‘it’s my phone
ringing.’ This belief explains her subsequent actions—embarrassment, mo-
tion towards her luggage, apologies to the other passengers etc. John Perry
5See Lewis’s [Lew75], for example).
9
considers a similar example in [Per93] and concludes that no replacement of
the indexical characterisation of the agent’s belief as ‘it’s my phone ringing’
could account for this behaviour. The (true) belief that the annoying phone
belongs to the passenger in seat 12A, for example, does not explain the be-
haviour unless we also add the belief that the agent would express as ‘I am
the passenger in 12A’, itself an indexical sentence.
Following Perry [Per79], it is useful to distinguish between what the
agent believes and her state of belief in so believing. As our embarrassed
agent retrieves her phone, the other passengers in the carriage may well
believe our agent to be the owner of the annoying phone, but they do not
share our agent’s feelings of embarrassment and the like. They all share
the same belief—who owns the annoying phone—but they entertain that
belief in different ways, and so are in very different belief states. Perry’s
conclusion is that there is something essential about the way we characterise
such belief states in an agent centred way, using I, me, here, now. No
substitute for ‘I’ or ‘me’ would allow us to explain the agent’s egocentric
behaviour. It is most natural, then, to classify belief states at a cognitive
level, in terms of I-thoughts; and the way we typically attribute I-thoughts
is through direct quotation: she believed “that’s my phone.” We classify
belief states, therefore, using sentences. The same considerations apply
when classifying desire states. If all the runners in the race want to win, for
example, then they are all in the same (local, not total) desire state. Yet
there is no one contender such that all the contenders want that person to
win, so they all have different desires.
However, even with this distinction in place, it is still not correct to say
that what an agent believes in having a belief is a function from worlds to
truth values. On this view, one believe would believe the same thing in
believing that Fermat’s Last theorem is true and that 1 + 1 = 2. Similarly,
in believing any logical falsehood to be true, one would believe the same as
one would in believing that 1 + 1 = 3, i.e. the constant function taking any
world to false. This same constant function would also account for beliefs
about Superman and Pegasus. Moreover, one would believe the same thing
in believing either that Bob Dylan or that Robert Zimmerman is a great
songwriter. These are all unintuitive results; they do not square with what
an ordinary speaker means by what one believes when one has a belief. What
Stalnaker’s view of propositions does achieve in a particularly elegant way
is a characterisation of the truth-conditional content of a belief. We should
conclude that whatever it is that people believe when they have a belief
should not be identified with the truth conditional content of their belief.
We might agree that belief is a relation between an agent an a proposi-
10
tion but that propositions should not be understood as functions from worlds
to truth values. An alternative is to consider propositions to be structured
entities containing semantic values, i.e. particulars, properties, relations and
descriptive conditions. This is known as the Russellian view, popularised
by Kaplan [Kap89] (amongst others) and adopted by direct reference theo-
rists. King [Kin96] considers structured propositions, a development on the
Russellian notion which includes the entire syntactic structure of a sentence,
represented in tree form, with semantic values appended to leaves. In Ka-
plan’s framework, an utterance (or a sentence in a context) first expresses a
(Russellian) proposition, which is then evaluated for a truth value at a time
and a world.
Such propositions play a roˆle intermediate between truth-conditional
content and belief state classification. They do not appear to offer any
advantage over Stalnaker’s view in terms of specifying truth-conditional con-
tent and do not represent a complete solution to the problem of belief state
classification. Structured propositions allow one to distinguish the belief
that Fermat’s Last Theorem is true from the belief that 1 + 1 = 2 but not
between beliefs which differ only in the salva veritate substitution of one
semantic value for another, without altering syntactic form. For example,
the beliefs that Dylan is F and that Zimmerman is F relate an agent to
precisely the same Russellian or structured proposition.
I do not think it necessary to assume the existence of propositions to
explain (or act as the bearers of) the truth of sentences, even in direct
discourse. A sentence can only express a proposition if it can be suitably
disambiguated and situated in a relevant context. The sequence of shapes
“I am not here today”, worked into the sand by a crab crawling to and
fro, does not express a proposition. So we may assume that we are dealing
with statements when we talk about the truth of a sentence in a context,
i.e. a fully disambiguated sentence. Given that the truth of a statement can
be determined at a world, why not use whatever mechanisms are used to
establish which proposition the statement expresses to establish its truth
value directly?
The objection here has to do with the distinction between rigid and
non-rigid terms. Descriptions, for example, pick out whatever satisfies their
descriptive content at the world that they are evaluated at, whereas proper
names pick out the same individual across all worlds (in which that indi-
vidual exists). Kaplan’s thought is that there needs to be two stages to the
truth-determining process: firstly, that of a sentence (in a context) express-
ing a proposition and secondly of evaluating that proposition at a world.
However, these facts of reference and modality do not entail that we must
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treat propositions at entities. Rather, we should evaluate suitable world-
insensitive versions of statements and always bear both the current world
and the actual world in mind when evaluating statements. For example,
by replacing ‘Tony Blair’ with ‘the actual referent of ‘Tony Blair’’, we can
evaluate ‘Tony Blair is prime minister of England in 2006’ at any world and
obtain the right results (namely that is is a contingent truth).6
Returning to belief contexts, the question of whether a particular belief
is true or not is precisely the same as the question of whether the sentence
that we use to classify the agent’s belief state is true in the appropriate
context. The picture we have is as follows. We classify an agent’s belief
state using sentences. Moreover, what the agent believes in being in such
belief states is characterised by the disambiguation of, and the addition of
actual operators to, these sentences. We can explain both the agent’s
state of mind and what is believed in believing something using suitable
sentences.
Dennett’s worry here is that language “forces us on occasion to commit
ourselves to desires altogether more stringent in their conditions of satis-
faction than anything we would otherwise have any reason to endeavor to
satisfy.” Language is too specific for the specification of desire, for “you
often cannot say what you want without saying something more specific
than you antecedently mean” [Den87, p. 20]. These worries apply equally
to the classification of belief states, “where our linguistic environment is for-
ever forcing us to give—or concede—precise verbal expression to convictions
that lack the hard edges verbalization endows them with” [Den87, p. 21].
We may object here that language frequently does not look as precise as
Dennett would have us believe. Vagueness, in particular, is an intrinsic fea-
ture of natural language. Our predicates tend not to neatly partition the
domain, but instead direct us to a sample to which the present case may be
more or less similar. We make extensive use of vague quantifiers such as for
most and, even when we use a determinate quantifier for all, the domain of
quantification is nearly always contextually specified, but need not do so in
a precise way (this latter consideration also applies to definite descriptions).
We can point to numerous examples in which an expression of desire
6Note that bearing both the current and the actual world in mind does not require a
two-dimensional modal semantics, i.e. we need not evaluate statements at a current world-
actual world pair. The correct semantics can be captured in hybrid logic. One evaluates
a statement ‘φ’ by first of all assigning the actual world to a world-variable x using the
‘↓x’ binder and then jumping to a suitable world using ‘E’. Then both the actual and the
relevant possible world are captured in the syntax of the formulae being evaluated, rather
than in its satisfaction clause.
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suggests satisfaction conditions broader than our antecedent desire. This
does not show that the desire does not have an intrinsic language-like com-
ponent, but only that the agent chose the wrong way of expressing her
desire. Moreover, in expressing a desire linguistically, one can appeal to all
the usual pragmatic features usually associated with discourse. A desire to
eat a low-fat meal, which excludes eating dust as a satisfaction condition, is
perfectly well expressed as ‘I’d like something low in fat’ in a restaurant set-
ting. Anyone thinking that serving the utterer a plate of dust would satisfy
the request is not playing within the conventions of the game. We often say
things that, taken literally, are either more general or more specific than we
mean, but this does not imply that meanings cannot be expressed linguis-
tically. It merely highlights how conventional practise allows us to express
ourselves concisely and efficiently. The same holds for desire and belief. This
is the first positive conclusion that I want to draw: a belief (or desire) state
and what is thereby believed (or desired) should be characterised in terms
of sentences.
Just what is the relationship between the agent and the sentences we use
to classify her belief state? Perry proposes the notion of acceptance:
One has a belief by accepting a sentence. . . . [Belief] states
have typical effects which we use to classify them. In particular
we classify them by the sentences a competent speaker of the
language in question would be apt to think or utter in certain
circumstances when in that state. To accept a sentence S is to
be in a belief state that would lead such a speaker to utter or
think S [Per80, p. 45].
Talking in terms of acceptance of a sentence highlights the difference between
being cognitively related to ‘Dylan is F ’ and to ‘Zimmerman is F ’. Corazza
asks us to imagine the subject as having an indefinite number of sentence
tokens and tokens of the psychological verbs ‘believe’, ‘desire’ etc. placed
in front of her. Then “[e]ach time our agent entertains an attitude she is
asked to do two things: (i) pick out a psychological verb and (ii) choose
from among the sentences the one she would use to express her attitude.
The sentence she picks out or points to is the sentence she accepts” [Cor04,
260].
However, here we are tempted to think of acceptance as a conscious
mental activity, along the lines of making a judgement or an act of assent.
If accepting a sentence is a necessary requirement for entertaining a belief
one would, on this view of acceptance, have very few beliefs indeed. I have
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many beliefs to which there corresponds no explicit act of acceptance, for
example the beliefs that there is a chair in front of me, that it will not move
as I sit down on it, that it will bear my weight and so on. If the notion of
acceptance is to be of any use, therefore, accepting a sentence must not be
treated as a conscious mental act. Rather, acceptance should be cashed out
in counterfactual terms, such that “there are infinitely many sentences one
is disposed to [accept]” [Cor04, p. 263], allowing the analysis to afford an
agent infinitely many tacit beliefs.7
Corazza develops this counterfactual condition in terms of the mental
representations of the attributer and attributee. One attributes the accep-
tance of a sentence to another when:
the attributee’s token mental representation (or cognitive par-
ticular) is similar to the one that would cause the attributer, in
the attributee’s context, to utter S. . . . two agents’ token repre-
sentations are of the same type insofar as they [accept] the same
sentences [Cor04, p. 262].
‘Similar’ here means ‘of the same type’. Corazza is explicitly committing
himself to a representational theory of mind: “A mental state . . . is a mental
representation plus the attitude relation (belief, desire, etc.) the agent bears
to the proposition. . . . A belief state, for example, is a mental representa-
tion embedded within the belief operator” [Cor04, p. 257]. Whatever the
truth of the claim that the mind is representational in all (or most) of its
aspects, the appeal to mental representations in explaining intentional at-
titudes is overplayed. Corazza allows for tacit beliefs, such that ‘yesterday,
I believed that there were no pink elephants dancing on campus’ may be
a true self-ascription. But what would a mental representation of no pink
elephants dancing on campus consist in? Certainly not in a mental repre-
sentation of this or that aspect of the campus, for a mental representation of
pink elephants dancing on campus is perfectly compatible with all of these.
Similar worries apply in the case of the conditional belief that p → q. The
reply is to claim that there are mental representations of p and q, combined
by syntactic rules into logically complex ‘representations’. We then arrive
at a fully fledged language of thought hypothesis (see, for example, Fodor
[Fod87, Fod90]). On this view, questions of psychological interpretation are
7Corazza uses the term n-acceptance, which does not entail accepting as true. This
allows for an analysis of desire, supposition etc. where the agent does not take the n-
accepted sentence to be true. However, in the case of belief, n-acceptance does entail
accepting a sentence as true; hence I have stuck to the usual term ‘acceptance’ in the
passage.
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settled by appeal to the primitive semantic properties of the language of
thought.
This account flies in the face of Wittgensteinian considerations concern-
ing privacy, for it seeks to locate meanings within a private mental sphere.
To paraphrase Wittgenstein, suppose that there existed in the mind some
private entity claimed to be a primitive semantic property. In consider-
ing the minds of others, which on this picture are as a black box to me,
“it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his
box”—i.e. each person having a different kind of mental entity claimed as
a meaning—“[o]ne might even imagine such a thing constantly changing”
[Wit02, §293]. But if we suppose that talk of meaning has a use in a public
language or, as Wittgenstein would have it, in a language game, then the
purported private semantic entity:
has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something :
for the box might even be empty.—No, one can ‘divide through’
by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is [Wit02,
§293].
Thus, even if one accepts the existence of symbols in the mind (captured
functionally in terms of brain processes) that are governed by syntactic rules,
this inner mental ‘language’ would still need to be interpreted. The prob-
lems of interpretation are discussed by Quine, who comments that “[t]he
metaphor of a black box, so often useful, can be misleading here. The prob-
lem is not one of hidden facts, such as might be uncovered by learning more
about the brain physiology of thought processes” [Qui70, p. 180]. Putnam
is in agreement, for ““[m]ental representations” require interpretation just
as much as any other signs do” [Put83, p. 154]. Thus, it seems that posit-
ing a symbolic system in the mind does not, in itself, answer our questions
concerning the semantics of belief.
Moreover, it is clearly not sufficient simply to have a mental representa-
tion of a snake lying in the garden, even if the cause of the representation
is of the sort that usually results in belief (such as perception), in order to
believe that there really is a snake there. If I know that my eyes are bad
and that I often mistake coils of rope for snakes on foggy days, for example,
I am unlikely to believe that the world is as it is presented to me. Note
that this might be the case even in cases of veridical perception. The claim
that “mental representations are all we need to explain attitude ascriptions”
[Cor04, p. 263] is surely too fast here; we also need an account of just what
the belief relation is, and this is precisely what Dennett claimed requires
an assessment of a particular “predictive strategy” [Den87, p. 15].
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Even with an account of the belief relation in place, it is not the case
that similarity of belief, even in identical situations, requires similarity of
mental representation. We might imagine interaction with an alien race
who behave similarly to us in similar circumstances, such that we would
be tempted to explain and predict their behaviour in terms of beliefs and
desires. However, it might nevertheless turn out that their mental represen-
tations (if they have any at all) are wildly different from ours. Should we
then say that our ascriptions of belief to the aliens were strictly speaking
false? Only if we take truthmakers for such ascriptions to be hidden facts,
settled by the realising physical properties of the agent’s consciousness. This
is, of course, not the way we ascribe such attitudes at all. As Quine says,
“[t]he problem is not one of hidden facts” [Qui70, p. 180]. Rather, Dennett’s
recommendation that we first decide to treat the agent as an intentional sys-
tem [Den87, p. 17] seems essential when explaining our notions of belief and
desire.
Following this line of thought, such attitudes are best cashed out in
terms of their relationships to other attitudes in a holistic way, such that
ascriptions of attitudes are ultimately used as a tool to explain and predict
behaviour. This is the approach advocated by Quine and Dennett, as dis-
cussed in section 2 above. To recap, Dennett distinguishes normative from
projective versions of the predictive account. According to the former, we
ascribe the attitudes that an agent should have, given her situation; accord-
ing to the latter, one ascribes the attitudes that one would have oneself in
those circumstances. Incidentally, Corazza agrees with the latter position,
holding that “[w]hen we attribute an attitude to someone, we often imagine
ourselves in her situation” [Cor04, p. 259]. Stich is also in agreement that
“[i]n saying what someone else believes, we describe his belief by relating it
to one we ourselves might have. And we indicate this potential belief of our
own by uttering the sentence we would use to express it” [Sti83, p. 79]. But
perhaps the locus classicus of this view is found again in Quine’s views on
indirect quotation:
we project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indi-
cations, we imagine the speaker’s state of mind to have been, and
then say what, in our language, is natural and relevant for us in
the state thus feigned. [Propositional attitudes] can be thought
of as involving something like quotation of one’s own imagined
verbal response to an imagined situation [Qui60, p. 219].
Ascription is thus “an essentially dramatic act” founded in part on our
“dramatic virtuosity” [Qui60, p. 219].
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It might be thought that there is an intrinsic difference between quota-
tion and reporting a belief, namely that quotation seeks to report something
about the attributee’s relation to the quoted words, whereas belief reports
say something about the world according to the attributee. This view is
the result of giving too much consideration to the use-mention distinction.
We are not tempted to say that cases of mixed quotation are merely about
words. For example, the sentence
Quine held that ascription is “an essentially dramatic act”
says that Quine held that ascription is an essentially dramatic act. It also
conveys that the choice of phrasing is Quine’s, not mine. The sentence is
just as much about dramatic acts as it is about Quine and ascription, despite
the former worlds being enclosed within quotation marks. So it is with other
intentional ascriptions.
To sum up the discussion so far, several sentential accounts of belief ap-
peal to the notion of acceptance, which must be cashed out in counterfactual
terms to allow for tacit beliefs. However, appeal to mental representations
does not give us the right kind of counterfactual conditions and can commit
one to the language of thought view of belief. Rather, the correct analysis
of acceptance should either be that an agent accepts what it should assent
to, given its situation, or that one treats an agent as accepting what one
would oneself assent to in similar circumstances. Note that on either view,
it is hard to follow Perry’s claim that acceptance is the contribution that the
mind makes to belief, for both accounts allow for the ascription of beliefs
to which the attributee’s mind has made no contribution whatsoever. It is
perhaps best to do without the notion of acceptance altogether and talk of
belief in terms of the agent’s potential to assent to a sentence (a conscious
mental act). The question then is whether the relation between belief and
(potential) assent is a normative or a projective one.
We have already seen that the former account treats agents as ideal
reasoners. Incidentally, in the case of an ideal agent making ascriptions, the
normative and the projective accounts should agree on what they ascribe.
This highlights a potential problem with the projective account, namely that
it will be more or less accurate (as a prediction of behaviour, say) to the
extent that the attributer and attributee share reasoning ability, resources
with which to reason and the like. An advanced chess player playing a novice
might find her opponent’s last move incomprehensible but still hold that the
opponent believed it to be a good move.
In the following section, the example of such a bounded (but not out-
and-out irrational) reasoner will be used to motivate an account of belief
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which locates an agent’s beliefs, as we should ascribe them, between ideal
rationality on the one hand and a description of the agent’s experience on
the other. The resulting agent is described as neither irrational nor as a
perfect reasoner.
5 Bounded Rationality
In the previous section, it was concluded that belief states are best classi-
fied using sentences. There is also no barrier to classifying what the agent
believes using sentences. The remaining question is how belief relates an
agent to a sentence and whether the relation is best captured by ascribing
the sentences that the agent should believe, given its circumstances, or by
ascribing the sentences that the attributer would believe herself in those
circumstances. Unsurprisingly, the focus of the discussion will center on
which type of account provides the best explanation of agents with bounded
rationality, i.e. agents which are neither irrational nor ideal reasoners.
Both types of account, normative and projective, make use of the notion
of the agent’s circumstances, which we may take to mean relevant experi-
ence. An agent’s experience relates directly to belief through observation
or rather, an agent’s beliefs are ultimately based on the sentences that clas-
sify her observations, i.e. observation sentences, in Quine’s sense [QU70].
This is precisely Quine’s methodology: “let us ask no longer what counts
as an observation, but turn rather to language and ask what counts as an
observation sentence” [QU70]. Just what makes a sentence an observation
sentence? Quine’s answer is that:
any second witness would be bound to agree with me on all
points then and there, granted merely an understanding of my
language. . . . In short, an observation sentence is something that
we can depend on other witnesses to agree to at the time of the
event or situation described. [QU70].
Observation sentences provide the link between observation and assent, for
a requirement of an observation sentence is “that all reasonably competent
speakers of the language be disposed, if asked, to assent to the sentence
under the same simulations of their sensory surfaces” [QU70].
It is clear that observation sentences cannot be of high logical complexity.
That is, even if p is an observation sentence corresponding to an event
e, ‘p ∧ (φ → p)’ need not be counted as an observation sentence for e,
even though it is logically equivalent to ‘p’. Someone might observe e and
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assent to ‘p’ but not to ‘p ∧ (φ → p)’, say if ‘φ’ is particularly irrelevant
or complicated to understand. The only way to guarantee that any two
distinct competent speakers will both assent to a sentence S on the basis of
witnessing some event or situation, is for S to be logically simple or a report.
Observation sentences are justified by experience alone, not by inference.8
It is beneficial to be generous with the notion of justification here, such
that “the man in front of me is in pain” can count as an observation sen-
tence. Knowledge of other minds, therefore, should not be counted as in-
ferred knowledge. It is important too that reports are included as obser-
vation statements, provided that the way in which the embedded content
is reported meets the criteria of an observation statement. Thus ‘the man
standing in that room said that S’ will, but ‘John said that S’ will not
count as an observation sentence, for not all observers could recognise the
man standing in the room to be John. Observation sentences give us a base
case for our ascriptions of belief to an agent: we ascribe, at the least, all
the observation sentences that the agent’s experience to date has justified.9
As Quine says, “the ultimate evidence that our whole system of beliefs has
to answer up consists strictly of our own direct observations—including our
observations of our notes and other people reports” [QU70]. Let us call
these the agent’s minimal beliefs. The question that then arises is, what
other beliefs should we ascribe to an agent, based on its minimal beliefs?
In the example of the two chess players, one of whom is far more compe-
tent than the other, the situation might be as follows. The first explains the
rules of chess to the second and consequently should ascribe belief in these
rules and knowledge of the positions of the pieces on the board to the other.
The less competent agent then makes a legal but inadvisable move, which
the more competent player certainly would not have made, in the same situ-
ation. In light of this, what additional beliefs should be ascribed to the less
competent player? One line of reasoning runs as follows: people play games
such as chess to win (amongst other reasons) and experience dictates that,
in order to win, one should make the best move available. If the players
did not share these beliefs, they could hardly be said to be playing chess at
all—rather, they would more accurately be described as merely moving the
pieces around. We should then infer that the less competent agent made
the inadvisable move because she (falsely) believed it to be the best move
8There is of course a complication here, in that theory (arrived at through inference)
can sometimes dictate what counts as an observation sentence.
9Compare Dennett’s predictive strategy, according to which all of “the truths rele-
vant to the system’s interests (or desires) that the system’s experience to date has made
available” count as beliefs [Den87, p. 18].
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available to her. However, this is neither the belief that the agent should
have, given its experience, nor the belief that the more competent agent
would have in that situation.
Rather, it is a belief that an agent might have who cannot follow through
all the consequences of her chess-playing beliefs. Most people can only imag-
ine how the game would progress given this or that move to a very limited
extent and thus, a bad move may nevertheless appear to be beneficial when
one of its consequences is unforeseen. It is not that the agent lacks the abil-
ity to reason in the right way—she knows all the rules of chess and how to
apply them—but rather that she lacks the cognitive resources to make the
right inferences. Compare this to a player who makes a bad move because
he thinks that her opponent’s queen may only move one square at a time.
We can certainly blame this agent for the mistake, whereas the previous
agent’s mistake might be perfectly blameless. If one misses an opportunity
to take the game, but it takes an advanced chess-playing computer several
hours to discover the required sequence of moves, we would not hold the
missed opportunity against the novice player.
So it is with many kinds of inference and in particular the inferential re-
lations between beliefs gained directly as observation sentences and beliefs
inferentially supported by observation sentences. An agent may be blamed
for having incorrect beliefs when those beliefs are misinferred from obser-
vation sentences (for example, by denying the antecedent), but failing to
believe all the commitments of one’s beliefs is, for the main part, blameless.
Agents typically have limited resources with which to figure out what they
should and should not believe in a certain circumstances. The chess playing
agents might have a time limit, but they also have a finite amount of mem-
ory which limits their ability to ‘look ahead’ to a certain number of moves.
Also, agents allocate these resources relative to their personal interests and
needs such that considering a chess move might make less resources available
for concurrent reasoning in other areas.
It should be clear that the kind of account required must be able to
distinguish between what an agent should believe, given a set of observation
sentences and what it could believe, given that same set and limited re-
sources with which to reason. This is the distinction between what an ideal
agent would believe in the same situation and what another agent with simi-
larly bounded resources could come to believe. Belief should be captured by
considering those sentences that an agent could explicitly assent to, using
her allocated resources, determined according to Dennett’s maxim that “one
is interested only in ensuring that the system is rational enough to get to the
particular implications that are relevant to its behavioural predicament of
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the moment” [Den87, p. 21]. Thus, given that a particular set of sentences
treated as beliefs would explain the agent’s behaviour and that a certain
amount of rationality must be attributed to the agent in order to credit her
with these beliefs, given what she has observed, we should credit her with
that amount of rationality in the other beliefs we attribute.
In this way, tacit beliefs, such as the belief that there are no dancing
elephants in this room, can be explained. An agent may not explicitly assent
to ‘there are no dancing elephants in this room’ at a particular moment of
time but believe it nevertheless. If questioned on the matter, she would
respond that there are no such elephants in the room. There are a number
of conventional as well as cognitive bounds on the resources available to
an agent, for example, the time in which a response is required by normal
discourse conventions, or the time in which a move must be made in a game
of chess. This is why how an agent replies or responds within that allotted
time bound is a good indicator as to what the agent believes.
It should be noted that amount of rationality is being used in a rather
precise way here to indicate how the resources available to the agent deter-
mine which of its commitments it may and may not become aware of. There
are several problems associated with this notion. If ψ is a consequence of
φ1, . . . , φn (say, in classical propositional logic), then
φ1 · · · φn
ψ
is a correct rule of inference. Then, as far as our ascription is concerned,
any agent for whom φ1, . . . , φn are beliefs obtained directly from observation
sentences should be able to become aware of its commitment that ψ in one
inference step. Then, for any of the agent’s commitments, we would have to
say that the agent believes it. Of course, this is not the result we desire and
so we must not use any acceptable inference rule in making our ascription.
Related to this point is the differing psychological complexity of inference
rules. Many find modus tollens more difficult to apply than modus ponens,
such that an agent with sufficient resources to apply modus ponens n times
may not be able to apply modus tollens as many times before its resources
run out.10 These examples show that we must fix a set of inference rules to
use in our ascription such that other, more psychologically complex, rules
can be explained. For example, in taking our set of rules to be the standard
introduction and elimination rules for the Boolean connectives, the implica-
tion (p → q) → (¬q → ¬p) corresponding to modus tollens can be derived
10My thanks to Stephen Mumford for making this point during a talk I gave at Not-
tingham.
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in seven steps.11 Thus, by counting inference steps in a system including
modus ponens but not modus tollens, the latter rule is modelled as being
more complex than the former. Of course the reverse also holds: this is why
we model, rather than explain, the relative complexity of different rules of
inference. That people frequently find reasoning with modus tollens more
complex than with modus ponens shows that the model including the latter
but not the former rule is to be preferred. In the case of artificial agents, we
might have to revise these assumptions, for example, if we know that the
agent reasons in a specific way using a fixed set of rules.
What of agents whose beliefs are to be explained through misinference?
An agent who is told that he will fail if he does not put the work in may well
feel surprised or let down on being told that he has failed, after putting in
plenty of work. We might explain his disappointment in terms of fallacious
reasoning, from ‘if x does not work hard, then x will fail’ and ‘x worked
hard’ to ‘x will not fail’ but our explanation might instead attribute the
additional inductive belief that, in most cases, hard work results in a pass.
If we have no additional knowledge of just how the agent came about his
expectation to pass, we would be tempted to attribute this latter belief
rather than explain the expectation as a mistaken inference through denying
the antecedent of a prior belief. This highlights our need to rationalise the
behaviour of others, such that we should prefer a rational explanation unless
the available evidence strongly indicates otherwise. An example of this latter
sort is found in Book 1 of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
where he explicitly says that universal assent to an Idea would imply that
the idea was innate, but that since no Idea is universally assented to, none
can be innate.12
The reason we feel the need to attribute intentional attitudes to agents
in the first place is tied up with our need to rationalise and predict their
behaviour. There may certainly be cases in which a reporter is forced to con-
sider an agent’s inferences to be invalid or irrational but, wherever possible,
the assumption of rationality is the course the reporter should take. Our
very practise of ascription is premised on the foundation of rationality such
11By assuming p→ q, then ¬q, then p). Deriving (p→ q)∧¬q → ¬p also requires seven
steps: assume the antecedent and eliminate ‘∧’, then assume p.
12Locke takes the argument from universal assent to be that there could be innate Ideas
“if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind
agreed” [Loc97, §1.2.3] and goes on to argue that “this argument of universal consent,
which is made use of, to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there
are none such; because there are none to which mankind give an universal assent” [Loc97,
§1.2.4].
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that, if widespread irrationality were the norm, intentional explanation and
prediction would cease to be of benefit. This is not to deny that irrational
opinion is a worldwide phenomenon. But, as soon as we consider just how
many mundane, everyday true beliefs even the most irrational agent has—
that chairs tend not move as one sits down, that chairs tend to bear one’s
weight and the like—we can see that even agents with the most irrational
opinions are likely to have mostly rational beliefs (that is, beliefs which are
faultless, given their resource bounds).13
6 The Fan of Bounded Rationality
Above, I argued that candidate formal models of downwards revision could
not be made to work. So as not to shirk my responsibilities, some formal
account of additive rationality ascription is now required. I will give only a
brief and fairly non-technical outline here. A model M is a relational struc-
ture which may be described by a modal logic containing the ‘♦’ operator.
The domain ofM is simply a set of points S (which, following standard prac-
tise will be called states), some of which will be related by a nontransitive
serial relation T , called the transition relation, which forms a tree on these
points.14 Each point is labelled by a number of non-modal sentences of our
language by the labelling function V , such that V (s) is a set of non-modal
sentences for each s ∈ S (note that V (s) need not be classically consistent
or deductively closed).
The particularity of the models we are interested in comes in the way in
which we fix T . Whenever Tsu, we say that there is a transition from s to
u. These transitions model potential atomic inferences: the act of an agent
inferring just one new formula from those it already knows. Thus whenever
Tsu holds, umust be labelled just like s except that, in addition, u is labelled
by one additional formula (i.e. for some φ, V (u) = V (s)∪{φ} whenever Tsu).
Here, I say that u extends s by φ. A state s may be extended by a formula φ
when φ is the conclusion of a rule of inference that we expect the agent to use,
whose premises match the formulas which label s (or rather, since such rules
tend to be meta-rules containing sentence-variables, we should talk about
φ being the conclusion under some substitution instance of a rule whose
premises, under that same substitution, are all labels of s). In a model M ,
whenever a state smay be so extended, there is a state u suitably extending s
13Dennett makes a similar point at [Den87, p. 19, footnote 1].
14The restriction to models in tree form is inessential, as it is a theorem of normal modal
logics that every model is bisimilar to a tree model. See, for example, [BdRV02].
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such that Tsu. Intuitively, models correspond to possible chains of reasoning
that the agent in question could perform, starting from the sentences which
label the root. Suppose an agent believes each of the sentences that label
the root of a model. Then a state at depth n in that model is labelled by
the sentences that the agent could realise to be consequences of its beliefs
in n steps of reasoning.
We apply a model as follows. First, we assign a minimal set of beliefs
to the agent, following the method I have described. Call this set B0. We
label the root of our modelM with all and only the elements of B0. Now we
have to fix what rules our agent reasons with, which will automatically fix
T . Just which rules we select will depend on our setting and our purpose.
If we are to model an AI system, for example, it makes sense to select the
rules of inference that the system actually uses.15 In the cases of human
belief, we assume that the agent reasons using whatever rules we expect or
are typical of human reasoning, including inductive reasoning and inference
to best explanation.16 Once we have fixed a set of rules, our model itself is
fixed.
Let us look at the model we have built. In models that include certain
deductive rules—natural deduction-style introduction rules, say—there will
be no finite bound on the length of branches through the model. In the
purely deductive case, the least transfinite fixpoint of each branch gives us
the deductive closure of the sentences which label the root of the model
(the minimal set of beliefs B0). Such points are the closest states to the
root lying on a branch but not reachable from the root in a finite number
of transitions. They represent the commitments of any agent whose beliefs
include B0. Section 2 concluded that an agent’s beliefs should be located
between its minimal beliefs and its commitments. In terms of our model, the
beliefs we should ascribe to the agent must lie somewhere between its root
and its leaves. Just how far from the root they lie is a matter of deciding the
degree of rationality we want to treat the agent as having: “one is interested
only in ensuring that the system is rational enough to get to the particular
implications that are relevant to its behavioural predicament of the moment”
15Many systems in AI are explicitly programmed in a rule-based fashion. Rule-based
programming allows for a great degree of abstraction in specifying behaviour and conse-
quently several rule-based agent architectures have been developed, e.g. SOAR [LANR87]
and Sim-Agent [SL99]. Rule-based programming extensions are also increasingly be-
ing offered as add-ons to existing, lower-level, agent toolkits, e.g., JADE [BPR01] and
FIPA-OS [PBH00].
16In the formal model described in [Jag06c] and [Jag06b], I only consider deductive
rules; formulating formal rules for abductive reasoning is no small task!
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[Den87, p. 21].
Suppose we find in our model a particular set of sentences which, treated
as beliefs and together with the desires we ascribe, explain what we want
to explain, e.g. the agent’s behaviour. We look for the smallest such set of
sentences, and find the state closest to the root ofM which is labelled by all
of these sentences. Call this state s; it has a certain depth δ in the model (not
to be confused with quantifier depth), equal to the number of transitions
required to reach s from the root. The parameter δ is in effect telling us how
many steps of reasoning would be required for the agent to realise that the
sentences that we are interested in are in fact consequences of its beliefs.17
In order to make sense of the agent’s behaviour for our purposes, we only
need to consider the agent to be rational enough to reason to depth δ in the
model.
The sentences that we should say the agents believes, then, are those
sentences labelling any state of depth δ. In terms of our modal language, in
which ‘♦φ’ holds at a state u iff there is a transition to a state v at which φ
holds, we say that our agent believes that φ iff ♦δφ (that is, φ proceeded by
δ ‘♦’s) is satisfied at the root of the model. In fact, we can generalise this
definition to any state in our model, since every state is the root of the tree
formed by its descendants. If we parametrise our modal language by δ, we
can define a sentential operator ‘Bel’ such that Belφ
df
= ♦δφ.
If the entire tree represents the reasoning possibilities of an ideal agent,
with one possible line of reasoning per branch, we have limited our attri-
bution of rationality by chopping off each of the branches at depth δ. We
might imagine a wedge-shaped fan, whose sides are of length δ, held over the
tree so that its sides run parallel to the outermost branches of the tree and
so I call the model we have built a fan model. The area within the fan repre-
sents the belief states that the agent could reason to from the minimal set of
beliefs we attribute it. The states we find along the bottom edge of the fan
are thus the most advanced belief states that this agent could reach, given
its bounded rationality. We should, therefore, attribute as beliefs whatever
labels we find at states along the bottom edge of the fan.
As with other modal epistemic logics, it is easy to extend the account to
incorporate multiple agents. Suppose we want to model agents a1, . . . , an.
Let ∆ = δ1 · · · δn be a sequence of length n, where each δi≤n is the measure of
rationality we want to assign to agent i. Models contain a family V1, . . . , Vn
17Our model is not in itself a justification network, but such a network can be extracted
by inspecting which rule is fired and which sentence added in each transition. Then the δ
parameter represents the justificatory complexity of the sentences we are interested in.
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of labelling functions, one for each agent. The language L∆ is parameterised
by ∆ and contains belief operators Bel1, . . . ,Beln and a family of additional




As it stands, this account is subject to one of the criticisms levelled
against attempts to downwardly revise assumptions of perfect rationality in
section 3 above, namely that an agent is assumed to be rational to degree
δ across the board. But agents typically direct their rational enquiry in one
direction or another. An agent who has followed through the consequences
of her beliefs about quantum physics, for example, is not guaranteed to have
been just as rational in her beliefs about ethics, or what constitutes sensible
footwear.
However, the account presented here is unlike those criticised above in
that this problem can be overcome by restricting our selection of states at
depth δ and less to those that can be reached from the root without irrelevant
inferences. Suppose the sequence of states s0s1s2 occurs on a branch b such
that s1 extends s0 by the sentence ‘murder is wrong’ and that s2 extends
s1 by ‘I should avoid wearing heels on icy days’. Under most classifications,
the topic has shifted quite dramatically from one inference to the next. If
we want to explain why the agent first put on high heels but then after
checking the weather decided on a pair of flats, we can ignore branches such
as b which include off-topic or irrelevant inferences.
Concretely, we might place all sentences in the language in an abstract
relevance network, such that the longer the shortest distance between any
two sentences, the less relevant they are to one another (the relevance rela-
tion is reflexive, such that every sentence is of the highest degree of relevance
to itself). Then, we decide just how relevant we want our agent to be, say
to degree r. We then return to our original chosen state s, whose labels
allow us to explain the agent’s behaviour, and look up all sentences φ of
distance no more that r in the relevance network from one of the labels of
s. A branch is then excluded from our considerations iff a state on that
branch of depth no greater than δ extends a previous state by a sentence
not selected from the relevance network.
It should be pointed out that, in practise, our choice of a degree of
rationality δ is often not a perfectly precise matter. It seems odd that, on a
particular choice of δ, an agent might believe φ and φ→ ψ but not ψ. With
a choice of δ+1, on the other hand, we would say that a does indeed believe
that ψ. This sounds somewhat unintuitive, but this is only to be expected
in an account in which agent’s beliefs are not deductively closed. This only
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becomes a problem when we try to classify belief states in terms of strict,
numerical identity, i.e. when we say that a belief state including φ→ ψ and
φ must also include ψ because the latter belief state must be identical to
the former. This is really just a way of saying that the identity conditions
on belief states includes the deductive closure condition. As I argued above,
this is just not the case. Rather, we should say that the two belief states are
sufficiently similar, in fact so similar that we feel it odd to say that an agent
believing φ → ψ and φ would not also believe that ψ. One-step inference
always produces similar belief states but chains of inference may not.
The case is somewhat similar to Sorites-style problems involving vague
predicates. Given a sequence of colour patches from dark red to light orange,
we would find it rather artificial to impose a sharp boundary between the
red and the orange samples, yet of course the end points are clearly differ-
ent colours. If we agree with Dennett (as I have here) that belief “can be
discerned only from the point of view of one who adopts a certain predictive
strategy” [Den87, p. 15], then a particular predictive strategy may well im-
pose a sharpened boundary, based on our reasons for predicting the agent’s
behaviour. Thus, “agent a believes that φ and φ→ ψ, but not ψ” is by no
means contradictory. Rather, such ascriptions fit in with our ascriptions of
predicates such as “is bald” and “is red” in general.
The fan models developed here are versatile. In [Jag06a], I discuss the
advantages of using such models to capture epistemic possibility. In these
terms, an account of dynamic information can be developed which avoids
the traditional problem of considering agents to be ideally rational reason-
ers with unbounded resources. In [Jag06c], on the other hand, I develop a
temporal account of the explicit beliefs (what Dennett would term opinions)
of AI agents, allowing one to build a model of an agent and check whether,
for example, the agent could come to believe some sentence φ within a fixed
time bound. As well as being versatile, the models developed here have
many interesting logical properties, as discussed in [Jag06b]. For example,
when modelling an agent with a fixed program (set of inference rules), the
satisfaction relation ‘’ is decidable. Such properties make these models
easy to work with. This adds support to my claim that the assumption of
perfect rationality in modelling psychological notions is unnecessary, both
conceptually and practically. I have presented a genuine account of belief
states according to which agents are not modelled as perfectly rational rea-
soners. When combined with the logical results given in [Jag06b], we see
that the formal models of this account are just as useful to logicians in mod-
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